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It is often claimed that the elderly live in inappropriate housing. Indeed
the claim is that many would like to live elsewhere and would, were
it not for the large transaction costs associated with moving. These
costs are understood to include not only direct monetary costs, but
also the psychic costs inherent in changing neighborhoods, losing con-
tact with longtime friends, and the like. This has been the rationale for
the belief that reverse mortgage schemes would be of benefit to the
elderly were the market for them easily accessible. This paper is the
first stage of research directed ultimately to the analysis of the trans-
action costs associated with moving for the elderly. It concentrates on
the empirical description of the relationship between moving and hous-
ing expenditures of the elderly.
There are three themes in the paper. The first is directly motivated
by the hypothesis that a significant number of the elderly would like to
use housing equity to finance current consumption were that possible
without having to incur the large transaction costs of moving. The
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proposition is not that the elderly live in housing that is inappropriate for
them and that they ought to move. It is not, for example, that an elderly
couple living in a large house that they want to leave to their children have
made an inappropriate housing choice. Rather the question is whether
the couple would like to use the housing resources for other purposes.
If this were the case, one might expect that when moves occur wealth
would be taken out of housing and used to finance current consumption.
A second theme is the extent to which the elderly more generally
decrease housing equity as they age. It is well known that a very large
proportion of savings is in the form of housing and that many of the
elderly have essentially no other assets. Vend and Wise (1986) report
that the median level of financial assets among respondents to the 1983
Survey of Consumer Finances was about $1,300. The median level of
all assets (excluding Social Security and firm pension plans) was $22,900,
the vast majority of which was in housing. Evidence on the assets of
the elderly is reported in Hurd and Shoven (1983), Diamond and Haus-
man (1984), and in Hurd and Wise (ch. 6, in this volume). Diamond
and Hausman, for example, report that 20 percent of those aged 45 to
59 had essentially no nonpension personal wealth in 1966. Nearly 50
percent had nonhousing assets of less than $1,000. Given that such a
large proportion of personal savings is in the form of housing, one is
led to ask whether it is used, as the life-cycle theory would predict, to
finance consumption in old age.
The third theme presented here is a descriptive analysis that will
serve as the first stage of a more detailed analysis of moving transaction
costs among the elderly. It sets forth the empirical regularities with
which more formal modeling and analysis must be consistent.
The analysis in this paper is based on the Retirement History Survey
(RHS). This ten-year survey follows families headed by persons who
were between 58 and 63 years old in 1969. They were reinterviewed
every two years until 1979. Data were collected on a wide variety of
socioeconomic measures, including income, wealth by detailed asset
category, retirement, health status, and many others. Merrill (1984)
used data from the 1969 and 1977 RHS interviews to study the home
equity of the elderly. The focus of her work is similar to ours, although
the details of the two analyses are quite different. In particular, we use
each of the six RHS interviews to analyze the moving and housing
choices of the elderly. By considering changes in each two-year inter-
val, we are able for the most part to associate changes in housing equity
with individual moves. By considering changes over short time inter-
vals, we also minimize the potential effects of attrition from the sample.
While our methods differ from hers, her basic conclusions are sup-
ported by our findings.11 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth
Section 1.1 of this paper describes the frequency of moving by type
of housing and by the wealth and income of respondents. Section 1.2
considers the correlates of moving. Who moves? In particular, retire-
ment and death of a spouse are emphasized. In addition, we consider
the relationship between income and housing equity, on the one hand,
and moving, on the other. The desire to sell a house to finance current
consumption might be expected to be concentrated among persons with
low current income and relatively higher housing equity. We consider
whether there is in fact a concentration of moving among persons in
this income-housing-wealth group. Section 1.3 compares changes in
housing value, housing equity, and user cost over time for movers
compared to nonmovers (stayers). Nonhousing bequeathable wealth is
also traced. If wealth is withdrawn from housing at the time of a move,
it should show up as an increase in nonhousing bequeathable wealth
after the move.
The conclusions of the paper may summarized briefly:
• The elderly typically do not use saving in the form of housing equity
to finance current consumption as they age, contrary to the usual
life-cycle theory. Indeed, as Bernheim (1984) and Merrill (1984)
have reported, housing equity increased with age over the period
oftheRHS.
• When the elderly move, they are as likely to increase as to decrease
housing equity. This suggests that the reason for the virtual absence
of a reverse mortgage market may be the lack of demand for such
financial arrangements. Even if the transaction costs associated
with moving deter many elderly from changing housing, these costs
are apparently not what is causing the absence of consumption of
housing equity by the elderly. Those who do move do not, on
average, withdraw wealth from housing. Thus the typical mover is
apparently not liquidity constrained.
• Many of the elderly with little current income also have little hous-
ing equity, so that little could be gained by converting it to an
annuity, even at an actuarially fair rate. This is consistent with the
findings of Manchester (1987) based on data from the Panel Survey
of Income Dynamics. That annuity rates are much less than ac-
tuarially fair, as shown by Friedman and Warshawsky (1985), may
be a further deterrent.
• The attachment to past living arrangements and the maintenance
of housing equity may be motivated by a bequest motive, although
this explanation is brought into question by the absence of a sig-
nificant relationship between change in housing equity and whether
the family has children, consistent with the findings of Hurd (1986)
for nonhousing bequeathable wealth.12 Steven F. Venti/David A. Wise
The elderly with high income and low housing equity are the most
likely to move; those with low income and high housing equity are
less likely to move than the former group but more likely than other
elderly families. One may conclude that moving by the elderly is
just as likely to be motivated by the desire to reallocate more
income to housing as to use housing wealth to finance current
consumption. However, among homeowners who move, those with
low income and high housing equity reduce housing equity the
most; those with high income and low housing equity increase
housing wealth the most.
Moving is strongly related to retirement and to precipitating shocks
such as change in marital status, in particular the death of a spouse.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 The Frequency and Nature of Moves
Much of the data that will be presented pertains to changes in housing
between two survey periods. Where the changes do not vary greatly
over the five possible comparisons—1969 to 1971, 1971 to 1973, etc.—
we typically present data for the 1973 to 1975 interval.
The likelihood that a family moves during a two-year interval depends
on housing type, for example:
%of




Those who rent are almost three times as likely to move as those who
own. The "other" category includes persons living with relatives, living
in homes owned by others, or paying no cash rent. Most moves are
between the same housing type. This is shown by the following tran-














Almost 80 percent of homeowners who move move to another house.
Change in housing tenure occurs mostly among the elderly who live in
other situations. Thus, when we consider changes in housing type from
one period to the next, we find that the vast majority of people are in
the same type of housing, except the small proportion of the elderly13 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth
who are in the "other housing" category at the beginning of the period,














Finally, some people who do not move do in fact change housing tenure.
Some rent the housing they used to own or vice versa. Others may
transfer ownership to children or to other relatives. In still other cases
someone else may assume the rent obligation. Change in tenure without
moving is especially common among those in the "other" category.
1















The transition matrices for the other years look similar to those for
the 1973-75 period. The transition probabilities for movers vary with
age, however. The RHS respondents were 62 to 67 years old in 1973.
In the 1973-75 interval, renters were more likely to change to owning
than owners were to change to renting. Transition probabilities for
movers by age can be calculated from the RHS by combining data from
all of the survey years. Only for the ages 60 through 65 (but not 63) is
the transition probability from renting to owning greater than the prob-
ability from owning to renting; for all other ages from 58 to 71 the
reverse is true. In this respect the RHS data appear to be consistent
with evidence from the Annual Housing Survey (AHS).
2
An indication of the cumulative effect of these transition probabilities
over the ten-year period of the RHS is provided by the likelihood of
moving between 1969 and 1979 for those who responded in both years.
The percentage of respondents who moved at least once during this
period is:




Many movers, especially renters, moved more than once. Of the orig-
inal owners who moved and were in the sample in 1979, 73 percent
moved once, 18 percent twice, and 9 percent more than twice. Of the
original renters who moved, 50 percent moved once, 24 percent twice,
and 26 percent more than twice. The following transition matrix for all14 Steven F. Venti David A. Wise















There is considerably more movement from renting to owning than
from owning to renting. Most of the original owners still own; 7 percent
rent. But 23 percent of original renters own at the end of the period.
The reason is that renters are much more likely than owners to move,
not that when renters move they are more likely than owners to switch
tenures, as explained above. Some of the initial respondents died, and
others dropped out of the sample for other reasons. This attrition may
have some effect on the recorded transition probabilities. Renters, for
example, are more likely than owners to drop out of the sample. We
do not believe, however, that attrition seriously confounds the inter-
pretation of the data.
Persons who buy often move out of state; renters are much less likely
to leave the state. The RHS provides limited information on the distance
of moves in the 1973-75 period. For initial owners and renters, distance
of moves is indicated in table 1.1. Half of all moves are within the same
city, and three-fourths are within the same state.
3 Almost 90 percent
of moves from one rental unit to another are within the same state.
1.1.2 Income and Wealth
Income and wealth by tenure are shown for 1969 and 1979 in tables
1.2A and 1.2B. Since a large proportion of personal wealth is in housing,
it is not surprising that homeowners have much more wealth than
renters. Owners also have much higher incomes, much more non-
housing bequeathable wealth, and more Social Security wealth, the
latter reflecting higher lifetime earnings.
The extent to which housing equity could be used to increase current
consumption depends of course on how much housing equity there is.





















































































































































aAll figures are in 1979 dollars.
housing equity compared to current income. For example, persons with
low income but large housing equity stand to gain the most by con-
verting housing equity into current consumption. An indication of the
potential for such transfers is provided by the distribution of housing
equity by income
4 as shown in table 1.3. Over 40 percent of those in
the lowest income quartile also are in the lowest housing equity quartile.
Thus a reverse mortgage may not expand by much the opportunity
for this group to increase current consumption. For example, consider
a family with housing wealth of $16,334, the maximum in the lowest
housing equity quartile (1979 dollars). Assume approximate average
male life expectancy at 65 of 15 years. Suppose that the household
obtains a loan for the value of the house and uses the proceeds from
the loan to buy an annuity. If both the mortgage rate and the annuity
"yield" are 10 percent, the annual income from the reverse annuity
mortgage would be only $548. In fact, this is an overestimate. The
annuity yield is typically much lower than the mortgage rate. In 1979,
the average mortgage rate was 10.8 percent and the average annuity
yield was 4.8 percent (Friedman and Warshawsky 1985). With these
rates, the income from the reverse annuity mortage would be negative,
-$212 per annum.16 Steven F. Venti David A. Wise













































































































aAll figures are in 1979 dollars.



























Housing equity together with other wealth is possibly a better mea-
sure of consumption possibilities. Their joint distribution is shown in
table 1.4. Again, those with little nonhousing wealth tend to have little
housing equity as well. Close to half of those in the lowest nonhousing
wealth quartile are also in the lowest housing equity quartile, and
almost three-quarters are in the lowest half. Data for other years look
very similar to those for 1973.17 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth





























The likelihood of moving is highest for those with an apparent im-
balance in income versus housing equity. The percentage that moved
during the 1973-75 period by income and housing equity quartiles is
shown for homeowners in table 1.5. The most striking feature of these
data is that persons who have relatively high nonhousing wealth but
low housing equity are the most likely to move. Persons in the highest
nonhousing wealth quartile are more than twice as likely to move if
they have low rather than high housing equity. Families with low non-
housing wealth but high housing equity are not unusually likely to














Percentage of Homeowners Who Moved

































































918 Steven F. Venti David A. Wise
used to withdraw wealth from housing and reallocate it to current
consumption.
According to table 1.5A, however, families with high housing equity
but low income are about as likely to move as families with high income
but low housing equity. Persons with high incomes but devoting rela-
tively little of it to housing may move to reallocate more of their income
to housing. This may simply reflect optimal adjustment to desired hous-
ing expenditure, given current circumstances. But it may also be a
response in part to government policies. Medicaid rules, for example,
often require virtual exhaustion of nonhousing wealth, but not housing
equity, before nursing home expenses are paid. Families with low in-
come but high housing equity may move to withdraw wealth from
housing because they are liquidity constrained. The evidence in the
section 1.3 supports these presumptions.
In principle, homeowners could withdraw wealth from housing by
increasing the mortgage on the house. Presumably those with the most
housing wealth would be in the best position to do this. And indeed
housing equity could be increased by paying off a mortgage. But change
in the amount of home mortgages has been rare in the absence of a
move. Thus, in practice it would appear that moving is typically the
mechanism by which housing wealth has been increased or decreased.
Recent tax legislation that eliminates the tax deductibility of interest
on consumer borrowing other than mortgages may change the fre-
quency of home equity loans, however.
The probability of a renter moving shows little relationship to income,
wealth, or rent. In particular, it does not appear that families with high
rent and low income, or with high income and low rent, are more likely
than others to move. The percentage of renters who move is shown
by income and total wealth quartile and by income and rent quartile
in table 1.6.
Moving is often associated with job change. Among the elderly, it is
more likely to be associated with retirement. It is also strongly asso-
ciated with precipitating shocks, particularly the death of a spouse.
The relationship of moving to retirement is shown in table 1.7 and to
the death of a spouse in table 1.8.
5 Homeowners are slightly less than
twice as likely to move if the respondent retires during the two-year
interval than if retirement does not occur.
6 The difference is also sub-
stantial, although somewhat less, for renters. The death of the respon-
dent almost doubles the likelihood that homeowners and renters move
during many of the two-year intervals. (The effect of change in family
size is shown in appendix table l.A. The numbers are close to those
pertaining to death of a spouse in table 1.8, although change in family
size could occur for many reasons besides death of the respondent.)
Possibly the most informative description of the relationship between



















































































who move in the next two-year interval, given that they have not moved
before that. These calculations are shown in table 1.9, by survey year
and by age. For example, 7.2 percent of the homeowners who were 58
in 1969 moved in the next two years, by 1971. Looking down the last
column, there appears to be a slight increase in the probability of
moving at the peak retirement years, 60 to 65, and possibly some decline
with age, although both effects are slight. There appear to be no im-
portant cohort effects, judging by the similarity of the percentages for
Table 1.7 Percent That Moves, by Retirement, Tenure, and Year
Retired: 1969-71
Did not retire: 1969-71
Retired: 1971-73
Did not retire: 1971-73
Retired: 1973-75
Did not retire: 1973-75
Retired: 1975-77
Did not retire: 1975-77
Retired: 1977-79



































aIn base year.20 Steven F. Yenti/David A. Wise




Death of original respondent: 1969-71
No death: 1969-71
Death of original respondent: 1971-73
No death: 1971-73
Death of original respondent: 1973-75
No death: 1973-75
Death of original respondent: 1975-77
No death: 1975-77
Death of original respondent: 1977-79
No death: 1977-79
aIn base year.
Table 1.9 Hazard Rates for Homeowners







































































































people of the same age in different years. One might expect that not
moving for several years would tend to identify stayers versus movers.
If this selection effect exists, it should be revealed by declining moving
probabilities along the diagonals that pertain to the same cohort as it
ages. Those who enter each successive calculation have not moved for
longer and longer periods of time. For all cohorts this effect is sum-
marized in the bottom row. Any such effect does not show up strongly
in this tabulation, although it is possibly indicated by the decline from
around 8 percent in 1971 to about 6 percent in 1977. Whatever this21 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth
effect is, it may be indistinguishable from the effect of age. Calculations
in section 1.2.2 will help to make the distinction clearer, however.
Comparable data for renters are shown in table 1.10. The data suggest
a rather strong selection of stayers in the sample after successive pe-
riods without moving. There is on average a substantial decline in the
probability of moving as the number of years without moving increases,
summarized in the bottom row.
7 On the other hand, there seems to be
little effect of age, judged by looking down the columns.
1.2.2 Parameterization of Hazard Rates
Finally, these hazard rates are parameterized as simple functions of
age, retirement, family status, health status, and income-housing eq-
uity quartiles. Given that a person has not yet moved at the time of a
survey, the probability of moving by the next survey is estimated as a
function of these variables, using a probit functional form. Those who
move in a given interval are deleted from the calculations for subse-
quent intervals. The use of the probit form for the interval probability
of moving is consistent with a Brownian motion formulation of a con-
tinuous time hazard model.
8
The Brownian motion version of a hazard model may be described
briefly. Suppose that at age t there is a gain G{t) that could be obtained
by moving. It may be thought of as G(t) = M(t) - S(t), where M(i) is
the utility associated with moving to the best available alternative hous-
ing, and S{t) is the utility associated with staying in the present location.


























Hazard Rates for Renters

















































23.722 Steven F. Venti David A. Wise
That G(t) follows a Brownian motion (Weiner) process with drift u
means that:
• Every increment Git + d) - Git) is normally distributed with mean
ud and variance c
2d; and
• The increments for every pair of disjointed time intervals are
independent.
Because the increments are assumed to be independent, given G(t),
G(t + d) is a function only of G(f) and the drift u.
If moving is not an absorbing state, meaning that a person could
move and then move back again—not a realistic possibility in our
case—the probability that a person who has not moved by age t will
move by age t + d is given by
(1) Pr[G(r + rf)>OI G{t) = g{t)] = F{[git) + ud\/cd
l/2}
where F is a cumulative normal distribution function. This is an interval
hazard rate with a simple probit functional form.
If moving is an absorbing state, a family could not be in the same
house at the beginning and at the end of the period but have moved
during the interval. In this case, the interval hazard
9 becomes:
(2) Pr[G(r + d) > 0 I Git) = git)] = F{[g(t) + ud]/cd
 1/2}
+ exp[2ug(t)/c
2] - F{[g(t) - ud\lcd
m}.
In our case, d is two years, and the starting point g(t) must be
estimated. We parameterize u as a function of age; of housing equity
and current income; and of changes in retirement, family, and health
status. If the interval d is defined to be 1 and c is set to 1, equation (1)
is in the form of a standard probit specification. (The variance c is not
identified if there is no variation in d.) The results for the absorbing-
state version of the hazard tell the same story as those using the simple
model and are not presented.
An advantage of estimating the interval hazards period by period is
that the effect of each variable is allowed to vary freely as persons age.
The results for the simple probit are reported in tables 1.11A and 1.11B.
Table 1.11A is based on all intervals combined, while table 1.1 IB pre-
sents estimates for selected intervals separately. The last column of
the tables shows the change in the probability of moving due to each
of the attributes. The change is evaluated at the mean of all the other
attributes. For example, if the sixteen variables describing home equity
and income in table 1.11A are set to zero—identifying a family with
high income and high housing equity—and all of the others are set at
their means, the probability of moving is 0.084. If instead of high hous-
ing and high income, the family had low housing equity and high in-
come, the probability of moving would be 0.084 + 0.047 = 0.131, or
0.047 higher.23 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth





























































































































































































































aThe standard errors have not been adjusted for repeated observations for the same
person.
bThe probability of moving in the base case. It is calculated by evaluating all variables
within the category (age, home equity and income, retirement status, family status, or
health status) at zero and all other variables at their means. The A probability for other
attributes is the increase or decrease relative to this base. For example, the probability
that a move occurs if a person retires is 0.046 + 0.055. The probability associated with
the intercept is the probability of moving when all variables are set to their sample means.
Includes single to single, divorced to divorced, and widowed to widowed.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aThe standard errors have not been adjusted for repeated observations for the same
person.
bThe probability of moving the the base case. It is calculated by evaluating all variables
within the category (age, home equity and income, retirement status, family status, or
health status) at zero and all other variables at their means. The A probability for other
attributes is the increase or decrease relative to this base. For example, the probability
that a move occurs if a person retires in the 1977-79 interval is 0.022 + 0.077. The
probability associated with the intercept is the probability of moving when all variables
are set to their sample means.
cIncludes single to single, divorced to divorced, and widowed to widowed.28 Steven F. Venti/David A. Wise
The estimates support several conclusions. First, as indicated in
tables 1.7 and 1.8, moving is often related to retirement and is often
precipitated by the death of a spouse or by other changes in family
status. For example, based on the estimates for all intervals combined,
in table 1.11A the probability that a homeowner moves increases from
0.046 to 0.101 (0.046 + 0.055) if the head retires. The probability that
the typical married couple moves is 0.066. If the husband dies during
the interval, the probability is 0.118. Other changes in family status,
like divorce or marriage, are much more likely to be associated with




The estimated coefficients on the income-housing equity indicators
in table 1.11A show that the probability of moving is greatest for fam-
ilies with the greatest apparent imbalance in income versus housing
equity. The estimated hazard rates for the four home equity and income
levels distinguished in the probit specification, assuming other attri-
butes at their sample means are shown in table 1.12. The average hazard
rate is 7.6 percent. Holding other attributes constant, the hazard rate
for families with high income and low housing equity is 13.1 percent.
Those with low income and high housing equity are somewhat less
likely to move, although they are more likely than the average. These
estimates provide no evidence that homeowners typically use housing
wealth to increase current consumption. The results in this section
together with those below suggest that persons with high incomes and
low housing equity are likely to move to increase housing expenditure,
while those with low income and high housing equity tend to reduce
housing equity when they move. However, the data in section 1.3 show
that movers in general do not reduce housing equity.
Change in health status has little effect on the probability of moving,
according to our measures (see table 1.11 A). An improvement in health
is associated with a 0.019 increase in the probability of moving, from
0.067 to 0.086. A worsening of health status is associated with a 0.001
decline in the probability of moving.




























8.429 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth
The parameter estimates show no effect of age on moving. That is,
age at the beginning of a two-year period is unrelated to the probability
of moving. Note that these variables indicate ages that are two years
greater with each successive interval, beginning with 58 at the beginning
of the 1969-71 interval. The year effects, indicated by the first year of
each of the two-year intervals, are small but declining consistently.
They reflect the increasing selection of stayers as the number of years
without a move increases. The estimates indicate that those who have
not moved before 1977 are 0.024 less likely to move in the subsequent
two-year interval than the typical person in the sample in 1969 is likely
to move by 1971.
Estimates of the effect of individual attributes on the hazard rates
of renters are shown in table 1.13 for all survey intervals combined.
As with homeowners, retirement and changes in family status have
substantial effects on the probability of moving. There is no age effect.
Unlike homeowners, however, there are substantial year effects on the
probability that renters move, indicating substantial and increasing se-
lection of stayers as the number of years without a move increases.
Table 1.13 Probit Estimates of Interval
All Intervals Combined"
Variable

















































































































































































































Number of observations = 5,637
Log-likelihood = -2954.0
0.087 0.237
aThe standard errors have not been adjusted for repeated observations for the same
person.
The probability of moving in the base case. It is calculated by evaluating all variables
within the category (age, home equity and income, retirement status, family status, or
health status) at zero and all other variables at their means. The A probability for other
attributes is the increase or decrease relative to this base. For example, the probability
that a move occurs if a person retires is 0.189 + 0.118. The probability associated with
the intercept is the probability of moving when all variables are set to their sample means.
cIncludes single to single, divorced to divorced, and widowed to widowed.31 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth
The hazard rate declines from 0.294 in the 1969-71 interval to 0.151
in the 1977-79 interval. As shown in table 1.14, low-income families
are somewhat more likely to move, but there is no relationship between
rent and the likelihood of moving.
1.3 Moving, Housing Value, and User Cost
It has been shown that only about 8 or 9 percent of homeowners
move in any two-year period, and that only about 25 percent moved
over the entire ten-year period. Renters are much more likely to move;
about a quarter move in any two-year period, and almost 65 percent
of initial renters had moved at least once by 1979. Retirement and death
of a spouse are strong precipitating factors associated with moving.
In this section we consider how housing equity and user cost change
with moving. In particular, we analyze the extent to which wealth is
withdrawn from housing at the time of moving. The market value of
housing and housing equity are the principle measures that are analyzed
for homeowners.
In addition, we consider the change in nonhousing bequeathable
wealth. If wealth is withdrawn from housing at the time of a move, it
should show up as an increase in nonhousing bequeathable wealth.
This provides a check on the housing equity data. For example, persons
may undervalue their houses, especially during a period of increasing
housing prices. When the person moves and a new house is bought,
its actual market value is revealed. The difference between this value
and the estimated value of the previous house could exaggerate the
increase in housing value at the time of a move. The change in non-
housing bequeathable wealth would not be subject to this potential bias
however.'' If the elderly typically have more wealth in housing than
they would like, we would expect to see a fall in housing equity and
an increase in nonhousing bequeathable wealth among those who move.
Change in rent is determined for renters. In addition, we follow the
change in the user cost of housing for both homeowners and renters.
This provides a measure that is comparable for both groups. It also is


























21.232 Steven F. Venti/David A. Wise
a direct indicator of the extent to which the elderly move to reduce
such expenditures. We find that the typical move is just as likely to be
associated with an increase as a decrease in housing equity and that
user cost is also just as likely to increase as to decrease.
1.3.1 Housing Value, Equity, and Nonhousing Bequeathable Wealth
Two types of analysis are discussed. The first is based on changes
between adjacent survey years. In this case, the sample includes all
homeowners in the sample in each of the two survey periods. The
second is based only on respondents who remained in the sample over
the entire period of the RHS. This has the advantage of providing data
on families both before and after a move. On the other hand, effects
of attrition may have a more substantial effect on the calculations when
only those who remain in the survey for ten years are included in the
analysis. Attrition is unlikely to have an important effect on the cal-
culations based on two-year intervals.
1
2
Table 1.15 shows the change in the market value of housing, housing
equity, and nonhousing bequeathable wealth for movers and stayers
over each two-year interval of the RHS. The comparison with stayers
provides a control for economy-wide changes during each interval. In
two of the six intervals, the change in housing value for movers is
greater than for stayers. In four of the five intervals, more than half of
the changes for movers were positive. The equity value of housing was
also as likely to increase as to decrease when a move occurred. The
median change in equity value was usually somewhat less for movers
than for stayers, however, on the order of $1,500 or $2,000. In four of
the five periods, the fall in nonhousing bequeathable wealth was greater
for movers than for stayers. This may be the clearest evidence that
wealth is not typically withdrawn from housing at the time of a move.
The percentage with a fall in nonhousing bequeathable wealth was
typically almost the same for movers as for stayers.
An alternative description of these measures is presented in appendix
table l.B. It shows housing value, housing equity, and nonhousing
bequeathable wealth for those who were homeowners during the entire
period of the RHS. The data distinguish families by whether they moved
or stayed during a particular two-year interval and show the values in
each of the other years of the survey as well. Illustrative findings are
graphed in figures 1.1a, 1.1b, and 1.1c. The first of each pair of graphs
distinguishes those who moved between 1969 and 1971 from those who
did not move. Persons in either of these mover or stayer groups may
have moved or stayed in subsequent years. The second of each pair
distinguishes movers and stayers in the 1975-77 interval. Median home
value increased over the RHS period for both movers and stayers (fig.
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aAll figures are in 1979 dollars. Sample: All homeowners in the sample in adjacent years.
median home value of movers always increased at the time of the move.
The median home equity always declines somewhat at the time of the
move, but increases thereafter (fig. 1.1b). Movers have more housing
equity than stayers, based on these data for those who remained in the
survey for its duration.
1
3 And the difference is typically about as large
at the end of the RHS period as at the beginning.
Median nonhousing bequeathable wealth declines continuously for
both movers and stayers, and at approximately the same rate (fig. 1.1c).
At the time of the move it is as likely to decrease as to increase. (It
decreases in both of the graphs shown.) Again, the typical elderly




Finally, in table 1.16 we have estimated by linear regression the
relationship between family attributes and the change in home equity
when the family moves (to another owner-occupied dwelling). The
variables are the same as those used to estimate the interval hazard
rates in tables 1.11 and 1.13 above. We emphasize the relationshipMed. Home Value, Movers and Stayers
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Table 1.16
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aThe standard errors have not been adjusted for repeated observations for the same
person.
bIncludes single to single, divorced to divorced, and widowed to widowed.
between the change in housing equity, on the one hand, and initial
income versus housing equity, on the other.
Because of reporting errors, there is a tendency for those who report
an unusually high level of income or home equity in one survey year
to report a lower level in the next. In other words, errors in variables
create a regression toward the mean. To correct for this, we estimate
the change in housing equity for all homeowners, identifying separately
those who move. Thus, for example, the estimated reduction in home
equity for families who move and who report low income and high
home equity in the first year of a two-year interval is the difference
between the reduction for movers and the reduction for stayers; the
regression toward the mean is netted out. The mean change in home
equity for movers is shown in table 1.17.
Families with low income and high housing wealth reduce housing
equity when they move. On the other hand, families with high income
and low housing wealth, increase equity substantially at the time of
the move. Overall, movers are as likely to increase as to decrease
housing equity.
Homeowners apparently do not typically move to withdraw wealth
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constraint, although some apparently do. Indeed, there is a somewhat
greater tendency for moves to be associated with high-income elderly
who want to spend more on housing than with low-income families
with high housing wealth who want to withdraw wealth from housing.
Like the housing equity of stayers, the equity of movers tends to
increase from year to year before and after the move. Of course, the
increase in home value in the absence of a move reflects the economy-
wide trend in housing prices over the period of the RHS, not necessarily
a conscious decision to increase saving through housing equity. The
change at the time of a move presumably does reflect conscious inten-
tion. Nonhousing bequeathable wealth fell over time, usually more for
movers than for stayers. In considering life-cycle theories of saving,
housing equity is usually thought of jointly with other forms of saving,
presumably to be consumed in old age. These data suggest that this
view is not correct. Nonhousing bequeathable wealth is observed to
fall with age. Most housing equity will apparently be left as a bequest,
judging by the behavior of the RHS respondents through age 73.
This does not necessarily suggest that the reason housing equity is
not consumed is in order to leave a bequest. Indeed the change in
housing equity at the time of a sale by elderly persons without children
is about the same as the change for those with children. Housing equity
increases for about half of movers in each group. The same is true for
the market value of housing. There is some evidence that nonhousing
bequeathable wealth falls less for movers with children than for those
without children. The differences are not substantial however. This
suggests that the elderly may well be attached to their homes for reasons
other than or in addition to the bequest motive.
1
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1.3.2 Moving and Rent
The rent of stayers typically declines over time, as shown in table
1.18. On the other hand, the median rent of movers usually increases.
The initial rent of movers and stayers is about the same. An alternative
description of the data is presented in appendix table l.C. Like com-
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Median Rent, by Stay versus Move and by
Adjacent Year Renters*































































aAll figures are in 1979 dollars. Sample: All renters in adjacent surveys.
two-year interval, but it also shows rents in each of the other years of
the RHS as well. The respondents used in this table rented in each of
the years. Median rents are graphed in figure 1.2. Those who do not
move have declining rents. Thus there appears to be a substantial
benefit to remaining in the same rental unit. Rent increases of stayers
do not keep up with the rate of inflation. Indeed this apparent rent
advantage to continuing renters may provide an incentive not to move.
The rent of movers increases at the time of the move, but typically
declines in other years, reflecting the lower price faced by sitting ten-
ants. For example, the rents of those who moved between 1971 and
1973 declined somewhat between 1969 and 1971, then increased sharply
at the time of the move, and declined thereafter. Of course, both the
movers and stayers in the 1969-71 period could have moved in sub-
sequent or in earlier years.
1.3.3 User Cost
User cost provides a measure that is comparable for both owners
and renters. It includes rent, mortgage payments, heat, electricity, gas,
water, and trash removal. The change in user cost by tenure and move39 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth
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type is showain table 1.19.
1
6 The median change in the user cost of
movers who own in both years is typically small and close to the change
for nonmovers. Consistent with the rent data in section 1.3.2, the change
in user cost for renters who move is usually positive and is always
greater than the change for stayers. The median increase in user cost
for those who move from owner-occupied to rental housing is in the
neighborhood of $800 per year. Between 60 and 70 percent of the
increases are positive for this group. The median change for those who
move from rental to owner-occupied housing is negative in each in-
terval, but much smaller than the increase for those who make the
reverse move. Positive changes are almost as likely as negative ones.
User cost in each year of the survey is shown in figure 1.3 by move
status in selected two-year intervals. It is easy to see that median user
cost increases at the time of the move. In most other years user cost
declined for both movers and stayers. Again, it is important to keep
in mind that members of either group could have moved or stayed in
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aAll figures are in 1979 dollars. Sample: Families in the sample in adjacent years.
1.4 Summary and Conclusions
We have described the relationships between family attributes and
moving and between moving and change in housing wealth. Moving is
often associated with retirement and with precipitating shocks, such
as the death of a spouse or by other changes in family status. Median
housing wealth increases as the elderly age. Even when the elderly
move, housing equity is as likely to increase as to decrease. (Although
the RHS only follows persons through age 73, Garber [ch. 9, in this
volume] reports no decline [in fact an increase] from age 70 through
age 95 for noninstitutionalized households, based on the National Long-
Term Care Survey.) The user cost of housing typically increases for
both homeowners and renters when they move. Holding other attri-
butes constant, families with high income and low housing wealth are
as likely to move as those with low incomes and high housing wealth.
The median housing equity of families in the first group increases when
they move and the median of the second group decreases. Thus, the
typical mover is not liquidity constrained, although apparently some
are. High transaction costs associated with moving are apparently not41 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth





























the cause of the increase in housing wealth as the elderly age. Appar-
ently, the absence of a well-developed market for reverse mortgages
may be explained by a lack of demand for these financial instruments.
The evidence suggests that the typical elderly family does not wish to
reduce housing wealth to increase current consumption. For whatever
reason, there is apparently a considerable attachment among home-
owners to their habitual housing.42 Steven F. Venti/David A. Wise
While our analysis is based on quantitative data, the conclusions are
also consistent with qualitative information from the RHS. When asked
why they moved, only 9 to 14 percent of homeowners and 15 to 17
percent of renters indicated that the reason for moving was "to save
money." Only 11 percent of homeowners and 12 percent of renters
gave as a reason for wanting to move that they would like to "reduce
cost and work of upkeep." Observed choices when moves were made
confirm these stated preferences; indeed, saving money was not
pervasive.
Appendix
Appendix Percent That Move, by Change in Family Size,
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No A in Household Size, 1969-71
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Median Housing Value, Equity, and Nonhousing Bequeathable









































































































































































































































Median Rent, by Stay versus
Continuous Renters
8































Move and by Year,

































































Median User Cost by Stay versus
Interval, All Owners and Renters
































































aAll figures are in 1979 dollars.46 Steven F. Venti/David A. Wise
Notes
1. There may, of course, be response and coding errors in the data, and they
may be concentrated among respondents reported to be in the "other" category.
2. According to the 1973 AHS, 23 percent of owners with heads aged 62 to
64 who moved changed to renting; 32 percent of renters who moved changed
to owning. Of those aged 65 and older, the percentages were 39 and 15, re-
spectively (see U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development [1979],
table a-7). Excluding the "other" category, apparently making the data more



































Although the RHS samples families and the AHS samples structures, the data
from the two surveys do not appear to be inconsistent.
3. The "same state" percentages in the tabulation exclude the "same city."
4. Income includes wages, capital income, pension income, and Social Se-
curity income. The income quartiles are: <$5,400, $5,400-$ 10,651, $10,651-
$17,902, and $17,902+. The housing equity quartiles are: <$16,334; $16,334-
$27,767; $27,767-$45,407; and $45,407 + . The nonhousing wealth quartiles are:
<$64,254; $64,254-$101,599; $101,599-$152,731; and $152,731 + .
5. Respondents are denned as being retired if they report that they are retired
or that they are partially retired but are neither working nor looking for work.
6. In the beginning of the ten-year RHS period, most of those who do not
retire during a two-year interval are still working, while by the end of the period
most who do not retire are already retired. The data in table 1.7 show that the
probability of moving is about the same for both groups, judging from the
percentages in the 1969-71 and 1977-79 intervals, for example—6.7 and 7.2,
respectively.
7. To the extent that this progressive selection of stayers versus movers is
important, a more formal analysis should account for it. It must also recognize
that persons are observed in mid-tenure at the beginning of the survey: some
have moved recently, while others have been in the same dwelling for many
years, sometimes referred to as left censoring.
8. Strictly speaking, this is only true if a move is "nonabsorbing." In our
case it is absorbing. The probit estimates, however, provide accurate descrip-
tions of the hazard rates over the two-year intervals. See, for example, Haus-
man and Wise (1985).47 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth
9. See Cox and Miller (1965).
10. Other studies also report substantial increases in mobility associated with
these demographic shocks. See Feinstein and McFadden (ch. 2, in this volume)
who report the effects of both retirement and changes in family composition,
and Merrill (1984) who reports the effects of retirement, also based on the
RHS.
11. In addition, housing value and other wealth measures have been imputed
when they are missing. To the extent that this introduces error in the mea-
surements used here, the error should be less for bequeathable wealth, which
is composed of several individually reported categories. We also calculated
the change in the housing equity and housing value of movers based only on
the reported values of those who responded to the relevant questions. The
results were virtually the same as those obtained using imputations for the
missing values. We are indebted to Michael Hurd for putting together a very
complete and detailed asset tape from the RHS original data.
12. Merrill (1984) used only families in the sample in both 1969 and 1977.
13. The analysis based on adjacent survey years indicates the opposite.
14. An apparent anomaly in the data is that among the few homeowners who
are reported to move to rental housing, there is no appreciable increase in
nonhousing bequeathable wealth, although the medians are positive. Indeed,
the sum of the change in housing wealth and the change in nonhousing be-
queathable wealth is negative, at the median, for this group. In part, the moves
are associated with the death of a husband, and we know from Hurd and Wise
(ch. 6, in this volume) that substantial wealth is lost at the death of the husband.
In addition, some wealth may be transferred to children. Symmetrically, there
is an increase in the reported sum of the changes in these two categories among
families who move from renting to owning. We have been unable to find a
complete explanation.
15. See similar evidence in Hurd (1986) that pertains to nonhousing be-
queathable wealth. On the surface at least, this evidence appears to be incon-
sistent with Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985).
16. Because of a change in the wording of some of the survey questions used
to calculate user cost, the 1969 data are inconsistent with data for subsequent
years. For this reason 1969 figures are deleted from the graphs in figure 1.3.
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Comment James M. Poterba
Two issues have guided recent policy debates about housing and the
elderly. The first concerns the higher incidence of substandard housing
among elderly households than the population at large. The second
concern, and the motivation for the current paper, is the possibility
that some elderly households with low incomes have significant housing
but they cannot use it to finance current consumption because of capital
market imperfections. The existence of such households may justify
government programs to promote or to provide home equity loans.
In this paper, Venti and Wise uncover a variety of stylized facts
about the housing behavior of the elderly, particularly regarding finan-
cial matters. Their findings provide a useful background for policy
discussions on both reverse annuity mortgages and home equity loans.
Most of the chapter is devoted to an exploratory data analysis of the
housing choices of elderly households in the Retirement History Survey
(RHS). Related tabulations are reported in Merrill (1984). The most
important finding is that reverse-annuity mortgages are of limited value
James M. Poterba is a Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.49 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth
as a policy tool for helping the indigent elderly, because most low-
income elderly households have relatively little housing equity.
I agree with the majority of the conclusions drawn by the authors,
but I am skeptical of three of their findings. My reservations, which
arise principally from limitations of the RHS data set and not from the
analysis, are detailed below.
1. Tenure switching by elderly households. Venti and Wise tabulate
the probabilities of tenure transitions, conditional upon a move, and
find relatively little evidence for movement from owner-occupation to
rental accommodation. Their results, aggregating the "Rent" and












A panel data set like the RHS is subject to attrition bias (nearly 20
percent of the sample households were lost between 1969 and 1979).
Households that move, especially those that move significant distances,
are particularly likely to disappear from the survey. The resulting
oversampling of stayers and short distance movers, as well as the other
sampling biases induced by data "cleaning" procedures that further
reduce the sample size, may make the RHS sample unrepresentative
of the elderly population at large.
These biases are difficult to evaluate. One natural check is to compare
the RHS results with those from other cross-sectional household sur-
veys. Tabulations from the 1973 Annual Housing Survey (AHS), re-
ported in U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1979,
table A-7), indicate that owner-occupants aged 65+ who move are
much more likely to switch to rental accommodations than the RHS












The conditional probability that owners switch tenures given that they
move (POR) is twice as large as in the Venti-Wise data.
The two sets of transition probabilities may not be directly compa-
rable however. The AHS estimates are transition rates over a one-year
time span, while those from the RHS are necessarily separated by two50 Steven F. Venti/David A. Wise
years. This should not matter a great deal if most individuals experience
at most one housing transition every few years. If elderly households
tend to move from one area to another, however, and rent for a brief
period after arriving in the new location until they find a suitable house
for purchase, then the one- and two-year transition rates may show
radically different patterns. This view implies that the one-year mobility
rate should show a much greater propensity to enter the rental tenure
than the longer-horizon transition rates. Further noncomparabilities
arise because the RHS asks respondents only about their current be-
havior, while the AHS asks about behavior over a twelve-month period.
Finally, the RHS respondents are younger than those covered by the
AHS table, and the AHS data suggest that the conditional probability
of tenure switching rises after age 65.
Data sets other than the 1973 AHS also suggest that the RHS results
are unusual. Feinstein and McFadden (ch. 2, in this volume) estimated
tenure transition rates in the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics and
found POR = 0.373, compared to 0.39 in the AHS and 0.22 in the RHS.
Stahl's (ch. 3, in this volume) analysis of the Annual Housing Surveys
for the 1970s and early 1980s also shows lower values of this probability
and also indicates a trend with age. For 60 to 64 years olds, POR = 0.35.
For those ten years older, however, POR - 0.65. This evidence suggests
that the Vend-Wise estimates of tenure transition rates may understate
tenure changes toward renting, but it does not dispute the general point
that the incidence of all types of moves is very low for elderly households.
2. The slope of the age-moving hazard. The second aspect of behavior
which the paper may not adequately capture is the age trajectory of
the probability of moving. The authors conclude that moving rates
exhibit little if any tendency to decline with age. This conclusion is
limited, however, to the "young elderly" who appear in the RHS sam-
ple. The survey provides a detailed record of the housing choices of
individuals in their sixties. Only one sample wave, 1979, includes a
significant fraction of individuals in their seventies. Much of the policy
concern, however, centers on the housing choices of the "extreme
aged," those aged 80 and above, and on the mobility patterns of house-
holds in their seventies.
The limited evidence on mobility rates based on Census and other
surveys suggests a decline after age 75. The U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census (1979) calculated mobility rates for dif-
ferent age groups and found a falling mobility rate with age:
Age Group Moving Rate (3- Year horizon)
55-64 0.059
65-74 0.049
75+ 0.04151 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth
The unconditional probability of moving declines by 50 percent be-
tween age 55 and age 75. Other survey evidence also bolsters the
declining hazard view. Feinstein and McFadden (ch. 2) report that the
moving hazard rate declines from age 55 to age 72, but turns up there-
after, and Stahl (ch. 3) finds a declining hazard over most age ranges.
3. Downsizing decisions by elderly homeowners. The most striking
finding in this paper is that elderly homeowners do not reduce their
housing equity when they move. The conclusion that those who do not
move accumulate rather than decumulate equity is not surprising, es-
pecially given the rapid increase in real home prices during the 1970s.
The finding that movers do not reduce their equity is more troubling.
One could construct explanations of why movers might not experience
changes in liquid assets. They may change tenures without selling their
original house, or they may move to a new rental unit while their home
is still on the market. Still other explanations could explain the small
increase in liquid assets for movers. They may give the proceeds to
their children, or they may transfer the entire house to a charity or
another beneficiary. Medical emergencies may catalyze the decision to
move and also place heavy financial burdens on the household, leading,
to a small net change in financial status. If this finding proves robust
when examined using other data sets, it will constitute an important
puzzle to be explained in future research on the economic behavior of
the elderly.
Inferences about the trajectory of housing equity among elderly
homeowners must be viewed with caution however. Some findings,
such as the tendency of households that move within the owning tenure
to increase their housing equity, may be due to data limitations rather
than economic decisions. My skepticism arises in part from the rapid
change in real house prices that occurred during the RHS sample pe-
riod. The following table shows the percentage changes in the Census
Bureau's "constant quality" new house price index divided by the














Near the end of the sample, when the chances of downsizing should
have been greatest, rapid real house price increases may confound the
analysis.52 Steven F. Venti/David A. Wise
Elderly homeowners may misperceive the value of their houses. In
a rising market, they may undervalue their homes by substantial
amounts. Figure 1.4 shows how this can bias the estimated effects of
moving on housing equity. In the years prior to its move, the household
reports home values along the dotted segment, although the actual
value of the house is growing along the solid segment. When the house-
hold moves, it learns that its home is in fact worth Po, and decides to
downsize to a home valued at Px. Perceived home value after the
transition continues to grow more slowly than true values. Because
the survey data on home equity is based on self-reported housing val-
ues, however, the measured change in home equity between the survey
dates 1 and 2 will show an increase when the household moved. In
fact, the household reduced its housing consumption through the move.
The difficulty in analyzing estimated asset values arises from the co-
incidence of behavioral changes, such as moving, and the arrival of
information that eliminates measurement error.
It is difficult to gauge the importance of these biases. Validation
studies of self-reported asset values find substantial error rates. Bro-
ida's (1962) study of auto purchases and auto loans, for example, showed




Fig. 1.4 Time paths of actual reported housing wealth53 Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth
survey misreported their loan principal by more than 20 percent, while
over a third made errors of more than 10 percent. I am not aware of
any direct studies of the quality of housing data in wealth surveys. The
bias of home equity changes is complicated by the tendency of house-
holds to undervalue their outstanding loans. An elderly homeowner
who decides to sell his house may discover both that it is worth more
than he thought and that he owes more than he thought. These biases
suggest caution in interpreting results such as the absence of equity
changes for homeowners who become renters.
Despite the three reservations just described, this paper provides a
wealth of useful statistics on housing behavior by elderly households.
In interpreting them, it is important to distinguish two questions: Why
do elderly homeowners move so infrequently? Why do those home-
owners with substantial equity stakes but low incomes fail to borrow
against their houses to raise current consumption?
Many reasons could be advanced to explain elderly homeowners'
reluctance to leave their homes. The transaction costs associated with
moving are substantial, and for households with a relatively short time
horizon, the present value of the gains from reoptimizing the housing
bundle may be small. The tax code in force during the 1970s placed a
sizeable capital gains tax burden on homeowners who realized accu-
mulated gains on their homes; subsequent legislative changes have
reduced this source of lock-in. Even the provisions of some welfare
and medical assistance programs, which condition eligibility on non-
housing wealth, may encourage elderly households to hold their wealth
in the form of housing.
The greater puzzle is why households that have substantial accumu-
lated equity in their homes, but low current income, do not seek ways
to liquify their housing wealth. The available evidence on this question
suggests that households (1) do not like to annuitize their houses and (2)
are concerned about the bequests they leave. The results of the Buffalo
Home Equity Loan Program, described in Weinrobe (1984), support
models of bequest behavior such as those in Bernheim, Shleifer, and
Summers (1985). The initial program in Buffalo permitted homeowners
in low-income neighborhoods to obtain annuity payments collateralized
by their house. The program was supported by a federal Community
Development Block Grant, but despite substantial marketing and out-
reach efforts it did not command great interest among eligible home-
owners. In a second stage of the program, households were allowed to
apply for a single lump-sum payment instead of an annuity stream. Vir-
tually all of the households that took advantage of the program after this
choice was available opted for the single lump-sum payment. Although
the actuarial value of the two plans has not yet been analyzed (Weinrobe
1984 is the most detailed discussion available), these results may suggest54 Steven F. Venti/David A. Wise
that household demand for annuities is simply not very large. Related
evidence is provided by the "property tax circuit-breaker" programs
that have been enacted in various states. Some programs, such as Or-
egon's, provide interest-free loans to qualified elderly homeowners that
permit them to defer their property taxes until they die or sell their homes.
Despite the financial attraction of this offer, Bowman (1980) reports that
only a few hundred homeowners in Oregon took advantage of the
program.
My final comment on this paper concerns whether the results are
likely to apply to the elderly households that retire in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. The last five years have witnessed dramatic growth
in second mortgages and reverse annuity mortgages of various types.
These mortgage instruments have grown from an $80 billion household
liability at the beginning of 1982 to more than $300 billion at the be-
ginning of 1987. Data on the demographic characteristics of households
using second mortgages are not yet available, but they are likely to
include households relatively late in the life cycle with significant ac-
cumulated housing equity. If these households take on new mortgages,
they will reduce still further the potential of policies targeted at helping
elderly homeowners by unlocking home equity.
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